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DEFINING THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

A PROGRESS REPORT TO COUNCIL

MANUEL F. COHEN, CHAIRMAN
COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES
MAY 1976

DEFINING THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

A PROGRESS REPORT TO COUNCIL

We are here to report on the progress of the work of

the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, to discuss some
of the problems we have encountered, to expose our thinking on
some critical issues, and to seek feedback that will help us in

our work.

our study.

It is now almost eighteen months since we undertook

I am sure that you are concerned, as the Commission

is, that we complete our work as expeditiously as possible.

However, we are in the middle of an enormous and complex assign
ment.

We have spent about forty-two days in meetings of the

full Commission and many more hours in preparation.

Our goal

is to define the role and responsibilities of independent
auditors and to. recommend carefully developed standards by

which their performance should be evaluated.
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I must remind you at the outset that we are not a
standard-setting body.

Our conclusions and recommendations

will not be issued as authoritative pronouncements.

authority will rest on their persuasiveness.

Their

An integral part

of our work is to persuade other bodies to adopt and implement

our recommendations.
Despite the absence of visible signs, we

have made significant progress in our study.

The

forty-page Statement of Issues, which we published last fall,
indicates the scope of our study.

Briefly summarize, the total

project consists of three fundamental elements.

The first is a

group of studies intended to develop an appropriate and workable

concept of responsibility in a number of critical areas, such as
uncertainty, fraud, illegal acts of management and communication

of the results of the examination including the formation of
an opinion on financial statements--the "present fairly" issue.
A second element involves consideration of the current

role of the auditor as it may be affected by other services, such
as MAS and tax, and how that role might be affected by extension

to new areas, such as forecasts.

Despite the withdrawal of its

proposal by the SEC, various pressures to engage in forecasting

will continue.
However, no statement of auditors’

responsibilities

will be useful unless it is within the capacity of the
auditor and it is consistent with the reasonable expec

tations of users.

Therefore, the third element of our study

is a comparison of the "resource inventory" of the auditor—
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e.g., his education., useful auditing standards and procedures, the
professional climate and regulatory structure within which he
works —with a reasonable conception of his responsibilities.
In addressing those issues, we have been probing

fundamental questions as:

•

What function do independent auditors
perform when they express opinions on

financial statements?

•

How closely is the auditor’s function

tied to the financial information with
which he is associated?

For example,

does an annual audit involve a respon

sibility limited to the financial state

ments or is there some continuous
responsibility not limited to particular

financial statements?

•

To what extent does the auditor have a
whistle-blowing obligation?

•

Should the auditing profession be viewed
as a single, unitary one or a tiered

profession with two or more layers that
involve different types of practice?

such
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Another fundamental question relates to the procedural
direction we are following.

Are we devoting too much time to

issues under study by the Institute’s auditing standards

executive committee or the Securities and Exchange Commission?
We think not.

Our perspective is different from that of the

auditing standards committee or the SEC.

We are considering all

of the issues in a broad integrated framework.

Our objective is

to articulate a coherent, consistent, and useful position on the

sensitive issues that shape the concept and understanding of the

role and responsibilities of independent auditors.
Let me review where we stand today on some of those

issues.

I emphasize that these "stands” are tentative positions

that will continue to evolve as we receive more evidence

from our own research and more feedback from individuals and
groups such as this.

I urge you to use the simultaneous

sessions that follow to comment on the specific points

I will make in the next few minutes.

We recognize that our conclusions on each issue must

be consistent with a realistic conception of the independent
auditor's role in society.

Basic to our study is the

conclusion that the essential role of the independent

- 5 -

auditor and the need for the function he performs lie in the

contribution

he can make to the credibility of the

financial information so essential to the public’s overall
confidence in financial markets.

Consequently, we believe

that a broader examination of the auditor's role with respect to finan
cial information beyond

formal financial statements is necessary

for a reasonable evaluation of demands for and possible exten
sions of the auditor’s traditional role.

On a more specific levels we are attempting to resolve

the persistent confusion that has surrounded the use of the term
’’present fairly.”

The result of that work—at least to date—is

in the paper "Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations,"
that was distributed to you before this meeting.

This paper,

tentative though it is, "fairly presents" the direction of the

thinking of the Commission at this point, the level at which we

are examining the issues, and the type of conclusions being
developed.
Widespread misunderstanding of the term "present fairly"
has contributed to the expectation gap confronting auditors.
Judge MacMahon’s

observation in the Herzfeld case that the

courts are appropriately concerned with "whether the report
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fairly presents the true financial position..
.to the untutored
eye of an ordinary investor," is evidence of the confusion.

In addressing the issue, we have not continued the debate

about what "present fairly" means to all who read that phrase.

Instead, we have attempted to state more precisely the nature
of the judgments and decisions required in forming an opinion
on financial statements.

A better understanding of the role of

judgment in the application of generally accepted accounting

principles and a strengthening of generally accepted auditing

standards to provide independent auditors with improved guides
to apply judgment should minimize if not eliminate much of the

debate and confusion.

We would impose greater and more explicit

responsibility on the auditor for judging the appropriateness
of the accounting principles selected and provide him with more

explicit guidance for making that evaluation.

We would require

auditors to stand back and evaluate the appropriateness of the

overall effect of the accounting principles selected and the

overall effect of the individual decisions made.
We believe it necessary to strengthen the message
that the financial statements are the representations of
management.

Thus, we have tentatively concluded that, when a

company faces unusual uncertainties, the financial

statements and related disclosures should bear the burden
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of highlighting

those

uncertainties and that the "subject

to” opinion should be eliminated.

A strategically placed note

to the financial statements describing the uncertainty and dis
closing the possible material adverse effect of an unfavorable

outcome would be far more desirable than the often misunderstood
and usually redundant ’’subject to” opinion.

This is consistent

with our view that management should assume a greater affirmative

obligation of analysis and interpretation of the financial state

ments and related disclosures.
In another area, we are attempting to clarify the auditor's
responsibility for the detection of management fraud.

In an audit

of financial statements, an independent auditor is concerned with

the adequacy of controls and other measures designed to prevent
fraud.

Auditing standards should clearly state that

he has an affirmative duty to look for fraud.

However he should

not always be held liable for failure to find it.

Instead, his

performance ought to be evaluated on the basis of the extent to
which he exercises professional skill and care commensurate with

a reasonable estimate of the costs and benefits of the audit
function.
touchstone.

The exercise of professional skill and care is the
The elements that constitute the exercise of pro

fessional skill and care ought to be identified and adopted as
a part of auditing standards.

substance of those elements.

We are attempting to identify the
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We have wrestled with two issues without yet developing

a consensus.

The first concerns the auditor’s responsibility

for the detection and disclosure of illegal and improper acts
of management.

That issue is perhaps the hottest topic around

today if not necessarily the most important in the long run.

In January, Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the Joint
Congressional Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Govern

ment, in an exchange with SEC Chairman Roderick Hills, seemed
to imply that the auditor should have the responsibility not
only for disclosing such payments but also of uncovering them.

Of course, we recognize that the independent auditor’s respon
sibility for illegal payments that have a material effect on the

financial statements is the same as his responsibility for the
detection of management fraud.

His performance should be governed

by the standard of professional skill and care appropriate to
fraud.

Beyond that, the issue becomes very murky.

thing seems clear to us:

One

The responsibility for disclosing

known illegal or improper acts

is different, and should be

considered separately from responsibility the independent

auditor may have for detecting such behavior.

I have been closely involved as legal counsel in several

of the leading cases in this area.

I know how delicate and

sensitive the question of the independent auditor’s responsibility
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is.

There are few guidelines.

Confusing signals appear to

emanate from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

guidelines have been promised by the SEC.

Some

However, until useful

guidelines are developed, the best that we can hope to do is to

lay out some possible alternatives for defining the auditor’s
responsibility consistent with our conception of his role.

this stage, we

have

no clear-cut solution.

At

The questions are

perplexing.

What role should materiality play?

be defined?

To whom should a disclosure responsibility run?

How should it

What would be the impact on the auditor-client relationship?
The stakes are high.

We cannot simply wait for the

regulatory bodies to set guidelines.

We must speak forcefully

to this issue and help to shape the evolving role of the
independent auditor in this area from a perspective broader

than merely the currently fashionable concern for illegal
campaign contributions and foreign bribes.

The second issue, with which we are still struggling, con
cerns the communication actually provided in auditor’s reports.
Evidence abounds that the standard report is misunderstood.

Recent surveys indicate that many investors do not bother to

read the auditor's report and that those who do read it do not
understand the premises on which it is based and the nature and limi

tations of the conclusions intended to be conveyed.

More disturbing

10

is the evidence from these surveys and other sources that many

investors view the report as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval."
We have concluded that ways must be found to communicate

better to those who rely on the work of independent auditors.
We are considering alternative ways of doing this that are not
limited to small revisions in the language in the auditor's

report. We have reached a consensus to recommend that a report

by the chief financial officer be included with the auditor's
report to reinforce the message that the financial statements
are the representations of management and to explain more pre

cisely the role of the independent auditor in their presentation.

Moreover, we are looking at the issue of communication not merely
in terms of the traditional standard report but also in terms of
other possible reports on other financial information.

to expose our views on possible alternatives and to

We plan

elicit

comment and criticism at public hearings.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that we are not com
partmentalizing issues.

Our conclusions on each issue must be

tested against our conclusions on other issues.
We have a broad range of interrelated issues and are

conducting research to develop evidence that will be useful in
our deliberations on those issues.

is the core of our study.

Indeed, our research effort
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Three of our research projects are designed to help us

identify problem areas in practice and to determine what can be
done.

The first is a broad survey and analysis

of legal and other cases involving alleged audit failures.
is basic to the entire project and involves
commitment.

This

a large manpower

The staff is compiling a data bank of significant

cases in the last ten years.
The second project

is a questionnaire survey of

current and former staff auditors.

The sample was

selected from the membership of the Institute.

The survey is

designed to study the effects of selected aspects of auditors'
work environment, such as time-budget pressures, on their behavior

and performance.

The third project in this category consists of interviews
of technical partners and legal counsel

of audit firms by members

of the Commission and senior members of the Commission's staff.

The interviews are arranged to allow those on the firing line

to discuss with us in confidence some of the problems they have
encountered in their experience.

In other areas, we are involved with two questionnaire
surveys.

The first queries analysts and investors on the sig

nificance to them of disclosures in financial statements
concerning

illegal and other improper acts of management.
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It focuses on acts whose effects are not material in traditional

financial statement terms.

The purpose is to determine whether

analysts and investors consider such information significant

for their investment decisions.
The second survey, conducted by researchers at the

University of Illinois, concerns communication in the auditor's

standard report.

We hope to obtain from the study more infor

mation on users' understanding of the auditor's standard report

in its present form.
In another area,

we are sponsoring a

symposium on the implications

of the growing body

of literature and empirical evidence that seem

to suggest that

the present scheme of financial reporting has very little impact

on the functioning of capital markets.

Several leading authorities

have been invited to discuss the problem for our benefit.

We are ever mindful of the need to consider the incre
mental costs and benefits of any changes that we may recommend.

For that reason, we have commissioned a study to develop a con
ceptual model for analyzing the cost-benefit relationships of

the audit function.

In addition, our staff and consultants have prepared
background papers on all of the issues on which we are reaching
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tentative conclusions.

Additional papers are in preparation.

They include papers on:
1.

New forms of reporting.

2.

Regulation of the auditing profession.

3.

Education and training of auditors.

4.

The relationship between the auditor and

parties interested in the audit function.

5.

The auditor’s legal environment.

It would serve no purpose here to repeat the issues in

our Statement of Issues.

You are aware that they run the gamut

of problems significant to independent auditors.

We are con

sidering the whole broad structure by which independent auditors
are trained, regulated, and disciplined.

We are looking at the

structure of the profession from the broadest possible perspective.

We are not ignoring the problems of any segment of the profession.
In probing the question

whether more explicit recog

nition should be given to the multi-tiered character of the
profession, we are giving special attention to the problems of
sole practitioners

and

firms with several rather than hundreds

of partners.
As might be expected with a project of this complexity,

there has been a considerable start-up period.

Lee Seidler, now

serving as deputy chairman of the Commission, has assumed principal
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responsibility for

day-to-day policy implementation

Doug Carmichael, who recently became

Of Commission activities.

the managing director of the technical divisions of the Institute,

devotes

substantial

time to directing the Commission’s staff.

Each member of the Commission works closely with assigned
staff on specific projects.
As We completed the clarification of the issues facing
the Commission, it became clear that the amount of skilled,

ienced person

exper

power resources necessary for the effective com

pletion of our task would be far greater than was originally
contemplated.
Three months ago, we began to seek the needed additional

assistance.

The critical need is for experienced audit personnel

who can apply that experience to the work of the Commission.

We asked the major accounting firms to provide such personnel

to the Commission, by lending us several managers for an
extended period.

Unfortunately, we have not been successful in obtaining
the necessary manpower.

Two firms, Arthur Young and Coopers

& Lybrand, responded quickly and effectively.

A highly competent

person from each firm is now working full time with the

Commission.

One of them, Bob Temkin of Arthur Young, will be

at one of the simultaneous sessions.

Another firm, Peat, Marwick,

has identified a staff member who will start with the Commission
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shortly.

Haskins & Sells is not only supplying Ken Stringer

as a member of the Commission, but has identified two managers
who will join our staff.

But, our needs are far greater.

I regret to say that

no other firms have yet found themselves able to identify and
provide the resources we require.

I cannot exaggerate the

seriousness of the problem and its potential impact on our
ultimate possibility of success or failure.
The Commission has been operating for 18 months and
has achieved, as I have noted, a good deal of success if only
in educating its chairman.

A great deal of work remains.

After a careful review of all

the remaining issues

and projects., and some paring of the scope of our work., we

estimate that an absolute minimum of 700 man weeks will be
needed to complete our task.

At our current staff levels

reflecting all the new assistance I have just mentioned, at

most, less than 400 man weeks are available to us.

Simple

arithmetic suggests that almost two years of work remain.

Two more years is an unacceptable period.
First, and most important, our report is needed by
the profession, and in less than two years from now.
Although we are constantly attempting to view our work

in a long-term perspective, if the Commission’s total life

were to run to almost four years, we would undoubtedly find
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that the rapid pace of change would condemn us to update
continually much of our earlier work.... suggesting a never
ending task.

Even today, the intensified activities of

AudSEC, which we applaud., force us to update constantly
those portions of our report that purport to describe the
"current” state of the art.
Third., three of the staff members made available to

us by the firms will be on loan for only one year, and it would
be unfair, in terms of their own careers, to expect them to

leave their regular work for a longer period.
Lastly, some consideration must be given to the
Commission members.

Their initial agreement to serve on the

Commission was predicated on estimates that the task would

require no more than a year and half.

We have already exceeded

that figure.

Every member of the Commission continues to hold his
regular position of major responsibility., in addition to his

work on the Commission.

Every member has made a considerable

personal sacrifice to serve on the Commission, and every

member is willing to continue to do so.... for a reasonable
period of time.

However, it is unfair for the accounting

profession to expect a time commitment of more than three times

that which was originally contemplated.... and it is even more
unfair to expect such a commitment in the absence of a vitally
necessary contribution from the profession.
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If we are to finish our task, not many years from now,

but within the maximum feasible time period of one more year,
we need at least 300 man weeks—6 experienced, competent staff

members—drawn from the ranks of the profession.
In a profession of well over 100 thousand members, where

some firms have more than 10 thousand professional staff, where
some annual audits require the equivalent of more than 50 man

years, I cannot believe that our requirements are unreasonable.
If the work of the Commission is truly important to

the profession, if the sacrifices of the Commission members are

to be Justified, the profession must stand up and be counted
by providing the assistance we so vitally need.
Inhere do we go from here?

As I have tried to indicate,

we have made a great deal of progress so far.

Further progress

is largely up to you, the leaders of the American accounting
profession.
Assuming that we do receive the assistance we require,

we will continue our progress towards conclusions on many of

the issues.

We expect to publish soon the first of a series

of discussion documents and schedule public hearings.

After

the public hearings have been conducted and all of the evidence

is in, we will proceed to complete our deliberations and
prepare our final report.
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From you, we ask interest, cooperation , evaluation
and frank criticism.

There will be a member of the Commission

and its staff in each of the concurrent sessions.

You have

had a chance to read one of our tentative papers and to hear
our report.

Now, I urge you to speak to us critically and

constructively in the concurrent sessions that follow,

Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
May 1976

